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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
JEFFERY GLORIOSO,

Case No. 900170-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

appeal

is from

the

conviction

of possession

controlled substance with

intent to distribute, a

felony,

Utah

in violation

8(2)(b).

of

This court has

Code

Annotated

a

second degree

Section

jurisdiction to hear the

of

58-37-

appeal under

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3-(g).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the

Mangleson

had

Trial Court

reasonable

and

properly

articulable

ruled that
suspicion

Trooper
to

stop

appellant's vehicle.
2.

Whether scope of the detention was reasonably related to

circumstances which gave rise to the initial intereference.
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
The

rules and statutes relevant to

case are:
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15:

a determination of this

Any peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has
is in the

reasonable suspicion to beleive he

act of commiting or

offense and may

has committed or

is attempting to commit

demand his name, address, and

a public

an explanation of

his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The
with

appellant, Jeffery Glorioso, was charged by information

one count

controlled

of possession

with the

substance, a second

held before the

distribute a

degree felony, pursuant

Code Annotated 58-37-8(2)(b).
hearing was

intent to

On August 8,

to Utah

1989, a suppression

Honorable George E.

Ballif, Fourth

Judicial District Court Judge, and on or about September 8, 1989,
Judge

Ballif

denied

appellant's

accordance and pursuant
App. Ct. 1988)
27,

to State v.

motion

was sentenced

suppress.

Sery, 758 P.

appellant entered a plea

1989, appellant

to

to

In

2d 935

of guilty.

(Utah

On October

an indeterminate

prison

sentence of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According

to the

Trooper Paul Mangleson

trial transcript

on

November 15, 1988,

observed two vehicles, a

gray Cheverolet

Celebrity, and silver Plymouth sedan with Arizona license plates,
travelling on
21).

Interstate 15 in

Juab County, State of

Utah (Tr.

The first vehicle carried Florida license plates (hereafter

referred
carried

to

as the

Florida

Arizona license

Vehicle), and

plates (hereafter

the

second vehicle

referred

to as

the

Arizona vehicle (Tr. 51) . However, at the time Trooper Mangleson
-2-

first observed

the Florida

carried Florida
51).

The

license plates

vehicles

Mangleson pulled
Arizona

vehicle he did

were

or Arizona

traveling

from the median

vehicle.

not know

license plates

northbound

when

strip and began to

Trooper Mangleson

then

whether it
(Tr.

Trooper

pursue the

stopped the

Arizona

vehicle for following to close (Tr. 50).
Once

the

requested

Arizona vehicle

was

stopped, Trooper

Mangleson

the driver's license and vehicle registration from the

driver of the

car (Tr. 21) .

The driver of the

Arizona vehicle

was Grabrielle Lopez (Tr. 22). There were two other occupants in
the vehicle, and they identifed themselves as Jose Teran and Jose
Martinez (Tr. 22.). However,

neither Mr. Teran nor Mr. Martinez

produced

(Tr.

any

Mangleson

identification

then searched

the Arizona

quantity of marijuana and
also found

a suitcase

in the

suitcase

vehicle. (Tr.

trunk of

and extra spare

27) .

and

53) .

vehicle and found

cocaine. (Tr. 25).

Steven Gregory on it (Tr. 26) . He
the Arizona

Pgs. 22

Trooper
a small

Trooper Mangleson

the car

with the

name

also found two spare tires in
Based on

the presence of

tire, Trooper Mangleson

the

thought there

was a good

chance that the two vehicles

were traveling together

(Tr. 55).

Accordingly, he requested that Trooper Randy Ingerman

look in the general business area of Nephi for the gray Chevrolet
Clebrity (Tr. 34-35).

Trooper Ingerman looked but did not locate

the gray vehicle in the general busines area of Nephi (Tr. 35) .
As Trooper

Mangleson was leaving

the scene of the

stop of

the Arizona vehicle, he observed the gray Chevrolet vehicle going
-3-

north on
hunch

Interstate 15 (Tr. 38) . Trooper Mangleson based on his

that the

pursue the

two

vehicles were

gray vehicle

Prior to the seizure of

traveling together

and subseqently

began to

stopped it. (Tr. 56).

the Arizona vehicle and Florida vehicle,

Trooper Mangleson did not

know whether the either vehicles

were

four lug or five lug vehicles (Tr. 52).
Once

the

Florida vehicle

was

stopped appellant

Glorioso

produced a valid driver's license and registration (Tr. 41). Mr.
The passenger

in the vehicle then produced

his driver's license

for Trooper Mangleson (Tr. 41) . From that point on appellant was
detained; he

was not free

to leave (Tr.

72) . The

vehicle was

then transportated from the roadside to the Juab County Sheriff's
office where
revealed

a

warrantless search

approximately

was performed.

one hundred

and

The

search

fifty-three pounds

of

marijuana (Tr. 47).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

evidence

established

that

presented
Trooper

at

the

Mangleson

suppression

possessed

no

clearly
reasonable

suspicion that appellant Glorioso was engaged in any illegal act;
therefore, the stopping

of his automobile and

based on a "good chance" or
traveling

with

the

seizing appellant

"hunch" that the Florida vehicle was

Arizona

vehicle

is

an

unconstitutional

seizure, and all evidence subsequently seized is inadmissible.
There
detention

existed no
of

appellant

reasonable
Glorioso

suspicion

for the

after

produced

driver's license and vehicle registration.
-4-

he

continued
a

valid

Accordingly, the

scope

of the

detention was

which may have justified the

not reasonably

related to

reasons

initial encounter - the location of

co-defendant Steven Gregory.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT BY TROOPER MANGLESON
IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONTITUTION AND THE CONTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH BECAUSE THE SEIZURE WAS NOT BASED ON
SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT SUCH A SEIZURE
The

Fourth

provides

Amendment

the "right

houses, and effects

to the

of people

United

to be

States

secure in

Constitution

their persons,

against unreasonable searches and

U.S. Constitution Amend

IV.

The

seizures.

Fourth Amendment functions

prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by law

to

enforcement

officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980).
The

Fourth Amendment

stopping

is implicated

the meaning of the fourth

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
individual and

seized the
seizure

this case

because

an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a

seizure within

an

in

Whenever, a police officer accosts

restrains his

person, and

be reasonable.

amendment. Delaware v.

the Fourth

freedom to

walk away,

he has

Amendment requires that

U.S. v. Berqnoni-Ponce,

the

95 S.Ct. 2574,

2578, 422 U.S. 873, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
It is well established that except
there

is specific, articulable

in those situation where

and reasonable suspicion

that a

motorist is unlicensed or that the automobile is not registered,
-5-

or that either

the occupant or the vehicle

is otherwise subject

to seizure for

violation of law, stopping of

the automobile and

detaining its occupant is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.

Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, and codified in

this state in Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-15 (1982).
The basic rationale for the imposition of the requirement of
specificity

in the

information

upon

which

police

action

is

predicated is the central teaching of fourth amendment jurisprudence.

Terry,

court to assess
an

392 U.S. at

21 nl8.

It enables a

the reasonableness of the

objective standard,

not

police action against

the subjective

good

faith of

individual officer.
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that at
some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge
who must evaluate the reasonableness of
a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances. And in making
that assessment it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the seizure or search "warrant a
man of reasonable caution in belief" that the
action taken was appropriate? Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing less than
"inarticulate hunches," a result this Court
has consistently refused to sanction. And
simple "good faith on the part of the
arresting officer is not enough.7... If
subjective good faith alone were the test,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be xsecure in
their'persons, houses, papers and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police.
Id at 21-22 (citations and footnotes omitted).
-6-

reviewing

the

Applying the specific,

articulable and reasonable suspicion

standard to the facts of this case/ the court must conclude that
there exists no specific and articulable facts upon which Trooper
Mangleson

could conclude

Glorioso was

traveling in was

the suppression hearing
not

stop the

citation.
because
were

that the

vehicle

appellant

engaged in illegal activity.

the purposes

Trooper

he thought there was

traveling together.

United States

in which

Trooper Mangleson testified that
for

(Tr. 74).

vehicle

of

issuing a

Mangleson seized
a "good chance"

(Tr. 65) .

and the Supreme

The

he did
traffic

the defendants

that the two cars

Supreme Court

Court of the

At

State of

of the

Utah have

both consistently refused to sanction stops of motorists based on
hunches.

Terry, Id

at 21-22, State

v. Mendoza, 748

(Utah 1987), State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct.
On

the

day

in

question

there

were

P.2d

App. 1988).

thousands

of

traveling on 1-15.

Many of which were in close proximity

Arizona

vehicle.

At

Glorioso

and Mr.

the

time

of

the seizure

Gregory, Trooper Mangleson

181

cars

to the

of

appellant

did not

known the

identites of these two individuals; nor did he have a description
of Steven

James Gregory.

Steven Gregory was
He

had only a

Nor did

Trooper Mangleson

a passenger in the Florida

hunch Mr. Gregory

was in the

know that

vehicle (Tr. 70).
vehicle. (Tr. 70) .

Furthermore, Trooper Mangleson did not know whether either of the
spare tires belonged
Mangleson

did

to the Florida

not even

know,

vehicle.

at the

time

Finally,
of the

Trooper

seizure of

appellant Glorioso, whether either of the spare tires fit the
-7-

Arizona vehicle.
because
is

To sanction the seizure of an automobile simply

it travels in close proximity

involved

in illegal

activity,

to another vehicle, which

without more

is

an extreme

expansion of appropriate police behavior.
Thus, the question in light of the above is whether a
reasonable officer, in view of the

totality of the circumstances

would have stopped Glorioso because he thought there was a "good
chance"

that the

two

vehicles were

traveling

together.

The

answer is obviously no.

No reasonable police officer would stop

one

vehicles which

of the

thousand of

travel 1-15

traveled in close proximity to another vehicle.
a seizure

would expose

thousands of

because it

To sanction such

innocent motorists to

physical and psychological intrusion by law enforcement
the Fourth amendment was designed to prevent.
at

1398.

Automobile travel

necessary mode of
people spend

of

security

exposing

transportation.

more hours

walking on the

is

Were

individuals

each

time he entered

in

Delaware, Id at

traveling

perdestrian or

subject to

other

"Many

cars than

a greater sense
automobile

modes of

than

travel.

governmental intrusion

an automobile, the

security guaranteed by

recognized,

are

when

often

unfettered

would be circumscribed.

protection

1401.

in their

in an

the Fourth Amendment
people

Delaware, 99 S.Ct.

Undoubtedly, many find

and privacy

officers

pervasive and

each day traveling

streets.

themselves by

a basic,

the

not

they step

shorn

from

of

their

As

all
homes

Terry v. Ohio,

Fourth

Amendment

onto the

public

sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step
-8-

from the sidewalk into their

automobiles,"

(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.

Delaware, Id at 1401

143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32

L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)).
B.
WONG SUN DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence
obtained after an illegal arrest or seizure must be suppressed as
fruit of the poisonous tree.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471 (1963), Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (quoting Wong Sun).
The

primary rationale

for

the

protect Fourth Amendment guarantees in
deterring
the

doors

lawless conduct by
of

the

federal

courts

is

to

two respects: in terms of

to

any

use

by closing
of

evidence

Brown, 95 S.Ct.

at 2259.

calculated to prevent, not to

is to compel respect for

rule

federal officials, and

unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
"The rule is

exclusionary

repair. *Its purpose

the constitutional guaranty in the only

effective way possible-by removing the incentive to disregard
it./lf

Brown,

Id at 2260

(quoting Elkins v. United

States, 364

U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (I960)).
In Brown, Justice
of

Rehnquist stated the clearest

indication

attentuation is required where official conduct is flagrantly

abusive of Fourth Amendment rights.

Brown, Id at 2265.

If, for

example, as the facts of this case establish, the factors relied
on by the police in determining to make an arrest were so lacking
in indicia of probable cause that as to render official belief in
-9-

its existence entirely unreasonable, or if the evidence indicates
that

the arrest

was

effectuated as

a

pretext for

collateral

objectives...1 would require some demonstratively effective break
in the

chain of

statement,

events leading from

such

presentation

as

the illegal arrest, to the

consultation with

counsel

the accused

before a magistrate for a determination of probable

cause, before the taint can be deemed removed.
Because Trooper
was not

or

Mangleson's seizure

based on reasonable

Brown, at 2265.

of appellant

suspicion Wong Sun and

mandate that all evidence derived

Glorioso

its progeny

from the initial illegality be

deemed fruit of the poisonous tree and thereby not admissible.

POINT II
WHETHER THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION EXCEEDED THE
REASONS WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE INITIAL INTERFERENCE
IN THE FIRST PLACE
Judge Ballif

in his

ruling denying

appellant's motion

to

suppresss held that once the identity of the Steven James Gregory
was

established

the

appellant Glorioso.
law

in that

a police

Mangleson,

probable

Judge Ballif's

Once

cause

of another

Appellant provide

appellant was

importantly his ruling

reason whatsoever to detain him.

the name and
this

free to

arrest

can be imputed

Code Annotated, Section 77-7-15
officer may request

to

ruling in effect creates new

Additionally, and more

contrary to Utah

person.

had

the criminal acts

third party.

that

officer

go

to a
is

which provides
address of the

information

to Trooper

because there

existed no

In United States v. Guzman, 864

-10-

F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), the court held that once a person has
produced a valid driver and proof
the car he must

that he is entitled to operate

be allowed to proceed on his way.

In this case

from the point appellant was stopped he was detained and not free
to leave. (Tr.
arrested and
stop and

72) . The

detained for?

arrest of

question is

what was appellant

Because no reasons existed

the appellant all

evidence seized

being

for the
from the

point of the seizure of appellant must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The
established

evidence
that

presented

Trooper Mangleson

suspicion to believe
activity.

at

the

suppression

did not

that appellant was

The seizing of a person based

possess reasonable

engaged in any

illegal

on nothing more than a

"good chance" or "hunce" is not reasonable suspicion.
therefore should

clearly

This court

vacate appellant's sentence, and overturn Judge

Ballif's order denying appellant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

AND DATED

this

£ Vl^ day of

July,

1990.

Jainfes Esparza
'
Attorney for Appellant
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